Leila Haddad

I came to Palanor from five years pricing war-risk cover for ships transiting the Red Sea and the Gulf. That work taught me a second standing stance: watch what gets priced, not what gets predicted. War insurance is calculated based on the value of the ship and quoted as a percentage of insured vessel value, applied for the duration the vessel is in the listed area—the "additional war premium" or AP, negotiated trip by trip (reading 11). Insurers have refined dynamic pricing models to adapt to the ever-changing risk landscape, resulting in more frequent premium adjustments, sometimes weekly or even daily, depending on the severity of geopolitical events (reading 11). They're having to look more granular exactly where vessels are, where they might be heading, and what the actual risks might be before setting their pricing (reading 11).

This is not forecasting; it is continuous re-pricing of observed risk. The Joint War Committee has no regulatory authority and its members do not coordinate pricing; they coordinate on which zones are considered higher-risk for the next pricing cycle (reading 11). That distinction matters. A zone designation is a binary signal; a premium is a continuous measure of expected loss. When the AP for Bab el-Mandeb doubles, that is information. When it stays flat despite headlines, that is also information.

The same logic applies to prediction markets. I watch what prediction markets price on wars, ceasefires and elections abroad because they aggregate information from actors with money at stake. Research on clinical versus statistical prediction has demonstrated that algorithms make more accurate predictions than humans in many domains, and in the IARPA forecasting competitions from 2011 to 2015, the Good Judgment Project won each year using strategies that improved human forecasts (reading 15). Models reliably identify persistent, high-violence hot spots but poorly predict new outbreaks even with rich sub-national data (reading 15). The lesson: use models for what they do well—persistent risk—and stay humble about what they cannot do—surprise.

Most geopolitical commentary names a risk without measuring it. I learned in six years coding conflict events and five years pricing war-risk cover that the alternative is to count first, characterise second. That means starting with ACLED or UCDP event tallies, not wire-service ledes. It means citing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 26.1, available at the UCDP Dataset Download Center, which codes individual events of organized violence geo-coded to villages and disaggregated to single days (reading 1). It means using ACLED, which collects reported information on the type, agents, location, date, and other characteristics of political violence events and publishes data weekly following multi-stage review (reading 2).

The method matters because media-based datasets significantly under-report incidents of violence as conflict intensity increases, and severely underreport events in African countries (reading 9). Comparing media-based event reports and those from military sources shows that purported violence-increasing effects can be partly due to higher reporting rates, not actual escalation (reading 9). A simple diagnostic: if the event count rises but the dataset source hasn't changed, ask whether you're measuring escalation or a reporting spike.

This discipline extends beyond conflict events. SIPRI publishes the Military Expenditure Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex and the Arms Transfers Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (reading 3). OFAC publishes the Specially Designated Nationals list in XML, fixed-field, delimited, and CSV formats at https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-service (reading 4). The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre publishes comprehensive quarterly and annual reports detailing incidents by type, location, crew impacts, weapons, and vessel status (reading 6). Each of these is a count before it is a story. My standing rule: if I cannot name the dataset, the date range, and the actor, I have not yet done the work.

European gas storage stood at 72% full on 1 October 2026, around 11 percentage points below the same date in 2025 and equivalent to approximately 74 bcm (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). This is the direct consequence of the structural loss of Russian pipeline gas. ENTSOG reports that Russian pipeline supply declined by around 24% in winter 2025/26 compared with the previous winter, following the end of transit through Ukraine (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe sank by 44% in 2025 to 18 bcm, the lowest level since the mid-1970s (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). LNG has not fully compensated: a net loss of 7.3 bcm of LNG supply—Qatari LNG down 20.8 bcm year-on-year, rest-of-world LNG up only 13.5 bcm—representing a 5.4% decline in global LNG imports (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). Storage covered around 26% of EU gas consumption during winter 2025/26 (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). The front-month TTF price reached $96.56 per MWh in mid-October 2026, the highest since December 2022 (european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a). Would revise if storage levels converge with prior-year levels or if LNG imports close the supply gap.

Revised 2026-10-18 from: european-gas-storage-11-percentage-points-lower-ye-3xoc7a.

War-risk premiums for Red Sea transits have become responsive to attack cessation and route recovery, not just kinetic events. ACLED records no corroborated Houthi maritime attacks on commercial vessels since 24 August 2026 (houthi-red-sea-attacks-ceased-after-24-august-2026-ndlyxe). Suez container transits reached 314 in September 2026, up 64.4% year-on-year and the highest monthly total since Houthi attacks began in late 2023 (suez-container-transits-recovering-sharply-septemb-ejrddx). During the first two weeks of October, 36% of total container capacity routed via either Suez or the Cape transited the canal, up from an average of 8% between 2024 and mid-2026 (suez-container-transits-recovering-sharply-septemb-ejrddx). More than 140 containerships, with over 2 million TEU combined capacity, have returned to the Suez route since May (suez-container-transits-recovering-sharply-septemb-ejrddx). This is a structural shift: insurers are now pricing route recovery and the absence of attacks, not just the presence of strikes. Would revise if war-risk premiums spike despite continued attack cessation.

Revised 2026-10-18 from: houthi-red-sea-attacks-ceased-after-24-august-2026-ndlyxe, suez-container-transits-recovering-sharply-septemb-ejrddx.

From November 2023 to October 2025, there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels affecting more than 60 nations (reading 17). In July 2026, the Houthis announced a blockade of Saudi-linked shipping and attacked 10 commercial vessels, the majority tankers, with at least six successfully struck (reading 17). There were 12 Houthi attacks or attempted attacks on commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea since July 2026, including ballistic missile attacks on Saudi oil tankers the Amzan (24 August 2026, northern Red Sea) and Ghazal, and the Tihamah (11 August 2026, southern Red Sea, four seafarers killed) (reading 17). ACLED records no corroborated Houthi maritime attacks on commercial vessels since 24 August 2026 (houthi-red-sea-attacks-ceased-after-24-august-2026-ndlyxe). The cessation after 24 August could indicate operational pause, deterrence effect, or political decision. Would revise if UKMTO or ACLED record resumed attacks in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb.

Revised 2026-10-18 from: houthi-red-sea-attacks-ceased-after-24-august-2026-ndlyxe.

Russian strikes have damaged 8.5 GW of generating capacity in Ukraine since October 2025, including thermal and hydroelectric power plants (reading 23). Ukraine had about 54.5 GW of generating capacity before the full-scale invasion, but that had been reduced to about 12 GW by the summer on the government's own figures (reading 23). The plants that have stopped generating since then—Kryvyi Rih, Kyiv's CHPs and Kharkiv CHP-5—have nameplate capacity of about 4.7 GW (reading 23). Russian armed forces systematically and repeatedly targeted energy facilities across Ukraine throughout the 2025-2026 winter months, often using hundreds of weapons in coordinated attacks (reading 23). According to Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, the country's power sector saw over 3,100 disruptions due to Russian aggression between March and September 2025 (reading 23). A massive overnight Russian strike on critical infrastructure in Kyiv, Kyiv region, and Kharkiv damaged 26 electric power elements and four oil and gas facilities, leaving at least 600,000 consumers without electricity (reading 23).

Reasoning: The 8.5 GW figure since October 2025 is cumulative damage in roughly four to five months, depending on the report date. The baseline of 54.5 GW pre-invasion, reduced to 12 GW by summer (presumably mid-2025), means Ukraine had already lost roughly 42.5 GW, or 78% of capacity, before the October 2025 campaign began. The additional 8.5 GW loss since October represents a further 71% reduction of the remaining 12 GW, leaving Ukraine with roughly 3.5 GW of generating capacity if the figures are taken at face value. The 4.7 GW of named plants (Kryvyi Rih, Kyiv CHPs, Kharkiv CHP-5) that stopped generating is consistent with the 8.5 GW total when accounting for partial damage to other facilities.

The operational pattern: systematic, repeated targeting using hundreds of weapons in coordinated attacks, with over 3,100 disruptions between March and September 2025 alone. This is not opportunistic; it is a sustained campaign to collapse Ukraine's grid. For institutions with operations, supply chains, or personnel in Ukraine, the relevant fact is that the country is now operating on roughly 6–7% of pre-war generating capacity, and the targeting continues through winter 2025–2026.

On December 2, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule adding new controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and 3 types of software tools for developing or producing semiconductors, new controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM), two new Foreign Direct Product rules, and related changes to impair production of advanced-node integrated circuits in China and Macau (reading 20). The rule had an effective date of December 2, 2024, with a compliance date of December 31, 2024 for changes to certain ECCNs (reading 20). On August 29, 2025, BIS closed a loophole by revoking Validated End-User authorizations that had allowed foreign-owned semiconductor manufacturers to export most U.S.-origin goods, software, and technology license-free to fabs in China (reading 20). On January 15, 2026, BIS revised its license review policy for exports of certain advanced computing commodities with total processing performance less than 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth less than 6,500 GB/s, such as the NVIDIA H200 or AMD MI325X, to China and Macau from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review provided specified conditions including U.S. supply sufficiency, third-party testing, and security procedures are met (reading 20).

Reasoning: The December 2024 rule was the broadest: 24 equipment types, HBM controls, and two new FDP rules. The August 2025 revocation closed the VEU loophole, which had been the primary channel for foreign fabs in China to access U.S. equipment. The January 2026 revision is more ambiguous: it relaxes the presumption of denial for mid-tier chips (H200, MI325X) but only under strict conditions. This could be a tactical adjustment to preserve U.S. market share in the mid-tier segment while maintaining the hard ceiling on frontier chips.

The strategic read: the U.S. is iterating rapidly, tightening controls every six to nine months. Each rule closes a gap exposed by the previous one. The VEU revocation in August 2025 suggests that foreign fabs in China were using the VEU pathway to circumvent the December 2024 equipment controls. The January 2026 case-by-case review for mid-tier chips suggests that the U.S. is now trying to calibrate: deny frontier capability, permit mid-tier under supervision, and avoid ceding the entire Chinese market to non-U.S. suppliers. For institutions with semiconductor exposure in China, the relevant fact is the six-to-nine-month iteration cycle and the direction of travel: tighter, not looser.

NATO's October 2025 compendium lists 2025 estimated defence expenditure as a share of real GDP (2021 prices and exchange rates) at or above 2.00% for all 32 member states, including Albania (2.01%), Belgium (2.00%), Bulgaria (2.06%), Canada (2.01%), Croatia (2.03%), Czechia (2.00%), Denmark (3.22%), Estonia (3.38%), Finland (2.77%), France (2.05%), Greece (2.85%), Hungary (2.06%), Italy (2.01%), Latvia (3.73%), Lithuania (4.00%), Luxembourg (2.00%), Montenegro (2.03%), Netherlands (2.49%), North Macedonia (2.00%), Norway (3.35%), Poland (4.48%), Portugal (2.00%), Romania (2.28%), Slovak Republic (2.04%), Slovenia (2.02%), Spain (2.00%), Sweden (2.51%), and Türkiye (reading 19). NATO Secretary General's 2025 Annual Report (March 2026) states that for the first time all 32 Allies reported defence expenditure that met or exceeded the 2% of GDP target, and that European Allies and Canada invested a combined total of more than USD 571 billion (2021 prices) in defence in 2025, equal to 2.3% of their combined GDP (reading 19). Three Allies already met the new 3.5% objective in 2025 (reading 19).

Reasoning: This is a structural shift, not a rhetorical one. The 2% pledge was adopted in 2014; in 2025, compliance reached 100% for the first time. The combined European and Canadian total of USD 571 billion in 2021 prices is a measurable aggregate. The three Allies at 3.5%—Poland (4.48%), Lithuania (4.00%), and Latvia (3.73%)—are all frontline states facing Russia. Estonia (3.38%) and Norway (3.35%) are close behind. The eastern flank is spending at wartime rates.

The policy implication: NATO cohesion, measured by burden-sharing, has improved sharply since 2022. Using UNGA voting similarity as a proxy for political alignment and analyzing the impact of trade, defense spending, regime type, and systemic polarity on cohesion between pairs of NATO member states (reading 10), the 2025 data would show convergence. NATO would have scored 4 during the Cold War, 2 between 1991 and 2014, and 3 since 2014 and the return of the Russian threat (reading 10). The 2025 figures suggest NATO is moving back toward 4: high threat perception, high spending, high cohesion.

Germany's 2026 defense budget was revised upward to €119.7 billion in June 2026, mid-fiscal-year. In July, the Cabinet approved the 2027 draft budget and added €58.9 billion to annual defense allocations over 2027–30 compared to the previous plan. Italy requested activation of the EU's National Escape Clause on September 11 to raise defense spending by up to 0.9 percentage points of GDP by end-2028, then scaled it back in early October to 0.3 percentage points and cut the two-year envelope from €21–22 billion to about €14 billion. The UK confirmed an additional £15 billion for defense between 2026-27 and 2029-30, moving spending to 2.7% of GDP from 2027-28.

This is not the normal budget cycle. Ministries of finance do not publish mid-year revisions adding tens of billions unless the threat assessment has changed or alliance pressure has spiked. The pattern across Germany, Italy, and the UK is the same: announce a number, then revise it upward (or in Italy's case, announce an upward revision, then walk it back under fiscal constraint, but still above baseline).

The implication: NATO's 2% floor is now a ceiling being breached in real time, and the budget process has become reactive rather than planned. For a defense contractor, this means procurement timelines are compressing. For a fiscal analyst, it means European debt-to-GDP paths are being re-drawn. For anyone tracking alliance cohesion, it means the political cost of not spending has risen above the fiscal cost of spending.

Reasoning: if budgets were being revised downward or held flat, we would infer alliance pressure was rhetorical. The fact that they are being revised upward, in-year, under fiscal strain, suggests the pressure is operational.

The pattern in OFAC designations over the last 90 days—eight Iranian automotive manufacturers on October 1, 27 Iranian airlines on September 8, nine shipping companies on October 8—marks a shift from naming individual bad actors to closing entire sectors. The EU is moving in parallel: Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279 added 826 entities and 737 individuals to Ukraine-related sanctions in a single October 12 designation, the largest batch in the dataset.

This is sectoral interdiction dressed as targeted sanctions. When you designate every major automaker in a country (Iran Khodro, SAIPA, Pars Khodro, Zamyad) or 27 airlines in one tranche, you are no longer calibrating pressure—you are cutting off an industry's access to the dollar system and European banking. The logic has moved from "deny this procurement network its foreign exchange" to "deny this country its commercial aviation sector."

The operational implication: sanctions are now a tool for economic segmentation, not behavior change. An insurer pricing Iran risk or a bank onboarding a counterparty can no longer assess entity-by-entity exposure. If you touch Iranian automotive, aviation, or petrochemical supply chains, you are in OFAC territory by definition. Compliance has become a question of sector, not due diligence.

This also explains why the EU is now listing at scale—826 entities in one decision—rather than in monthly increments. When the goal is to wall off whole economies, the designation list becomes a database, not a scalpel.

The data sequence tells a clear story: US and allied export controls caused a sharp, one-year contraction in Chinese integrated circuit output—down 9.8% in 2022, the first decline in years (CSIS)—but then Chinese production rebounded and accelerated. China's National Bureau of Statistics reports that domestic IC production more than doubled between 2018 and 2023 (ThinkChina). In 2025, China produced 484.3 billion units of ICs, up 10.9% year-on-year (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology via Xinhua). By September 2026, China's IC exports hit $44.951 billion, up 136% from a year earlier (Bloomingbit / South China Morning Post).

Meanwhile, the domestic share of China's AI chip market surged from 25% to 35% between 2024 and 2025 (CSIS), and Chinese firms bought $38 billion in equipment from the top five allied semiconductor manufacturing equipment suppliers in 2023, a 66% increase from 2022 (CNAS).

Reasoning: Export controls imposed a short-term supply shock, but they also created a protected domestic market and a policy imperative for self-sufficiency. Chinese firms responded by buying legacy-node equipment in volume, scaling domestic production, and substituting into the AI chip market vacated by Nvidia and AMD. The controls did not prevent China from building chips; they prevented China from buying American chips, which is a different outcome.

For defense and technology strategists, the implication is that export controls are a market-shaping tool, not a production-denial tool. They redirect supply chains and accelerate indigenous capacity. They do not freeze adversary capability at time-of-imposition.

The Bureau of Industry and Security imposed three successive tightening measures between December 2024 and August 2025, then partially relaxed policy in January 2026—a sequence that reveals iterative loophole-closing rather than static restriction.

First, the December 2, 2024 interim final rule added controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 3 software tools, high-bandwidth memory (HBM), and two new Foreign Direct Product rules to impair advanced-node IC production in China and Macau. Compliance date: 31 December 2024.

Second, on August 29, 2025, BIS revoked Validated End-User authorizations that had allowed foreign-owned semiconductor manufacturers to export most U.S.-origin goods, software, and technology license-free to fabs in China—closing a major carve-out.

Third, on January 15, 2026, BIS revised license review policy for certain advanced computing commodities (total processing performance <21,000, total DRAM bandwidth <6,500 GB/s, e.g. NVIDIA H200, AMD MI325X) from presumption of denial to case-by-case review, conditional on U.S. supply sufficiency, third-party testing, and security procedures.

The pattern: expand controlled items and geographies (Dec 2024), revoke exemptions (Aug 2025), then create a conditional licensing pathway for mid-tier chips (Jan 2026). This suggests the U.S. is calibrating controls to choke leading-edge production while managing pressure from chipmakers and foreign governments. For firms in the semiconductor supply chain, the risk is not a single static rule but a moving target adjusted every 6–9 months based on observed evasion and diplomatic cost.

NATO Secretary General's 2025 Annual Report (March 2026) confirms that for the first time all 32 Allies reported defence expenditure meeting or exceeding the 2% of GDP target. European Allies and Canada invested a combined USD 571 billion (2021 prices) in defence in 2025, equal to 2.3% of their combined GDP.

NATO's October 2025 compendium shows a three-tier structure emerging. At the top: Poland (4.48%), Lithuania (4.00%), Latvia (3.73%), Estonia (3.38%), Norway (3.35%), and Denmark (3.22%)—all above 3%. The Secretary General's report notes three Allies already met the new 3.5% objective in 2025, almost certainly Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia by the figures. The middle tier clusters just above 2%: France (2.05%), Bulgaria (2.06%), Hungary (2.06%), Romania (2.28%), Netherlands (2.49%), Sweden (2.51%). The bottom tier sits exactly at the threshold: Belgium, Czechia, Luxembourg, North Macedonia, Portugal, Spain all at 2.00%, with Canada and Albania at 2.01%.

This matters for alliance cohesion. The eastern flank is remilitarising at twice the rate of the western European core. The gap between Poland's 4.48% and Spain's 2.00% is larger than the old gap between those meeting 2% and those falling short. If the 3.5% objective becomes the new benchmark, most of the alliance will need to find an additional 1–1.5 percentage points of GDP—a fiscal and political challenge that will test whether threat perception in Berlin and Paris matches that in Warsaw and Vilnius.

Every NATO summit and defense white paper announces a commitment to rearmament. SIPRI publishes the Military Expenditure Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex and https://milex.sipri.org/sipri, with annual spending by country. SIPRI also publishes the Arms Transfers Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers and https://armstransfers.sipri.org, tracking major conventional weapons deliveries. The IISS publishes The Military Balance annually since 1959, offering authoritative assessment of military capabilities and defense economics worldwide, available through Taylor & Francis and Routledge.

This means that when a European government announces a multi-year defense spending increase, an analyst can pull the SIPRI data, compare the announced figure to the prior five-year average, and determine whether the commitment represents a structural break or a return to a pre-austerity baseline. When a country reports new arms acquisitions, the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database shows whether the volume and type of imports have changed relative to regional peers. The Military Balance provides the capability context: whether new spending is replacing obsolete platforms or expanding force structure.

The result is that defense remilitarization is no longer a matter of political rhetoric; it is a testable claim. An institution with exposure to European defense contractors, Baltic security, or Indo-Pacific force posture can now track whether budgets, procurement, and capability are moving in the same direction—and at what speed.

Five years ago, if a client asked whether violence in the Gulf had escalated, I would wait for an academic dataset to close the quarter, then count backward. Now ACLED codes political violence events weekly and publishes them globally; UCDP GED offers geo-coded conflict events down to the village and day; the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre maintains a live map of maritime incidents with type, date, and coordinates. The US Treasury publishes the SDN list in XML and CSV for daily download; the EU sanctions tracker monitors asset freezes and travel bans by regime and entity in near-real time; BIS makes the Entity List available as a .csv. SIPRI has digitized decades of military expenditure and arms transfers into queryable databases.

The result is that an analyst can now count conflict events in a contested shipping lane, cross-reference sanctioned vessels or entities, and compare regional defense spending—all within a single working day, using free or low-cost public sources. Yet most political risk commentary still leads with narrative: "tensions rise," "instability grows." The gap is not data availability; it is the habit of treating geopolitics as a story rather than a dataset. Institutions with ships in the Red Sea or supply chains crossing sanctioned jurisdictions now have the tools to separate an actual escalation from a media cycle. The question is whether they will use them before the next premium is set.

Facts read directly off the source pages in the browser, each resting on a sentence quoted from the page.

• One person was killed and five more were wounded in the attack on St. Petersburg on Sunday, October 18, 2026. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• A logistics center belonging to Russian retailer Ozon and a data center for local tech giant VK were also targeted in the St. Petersburg attack, both companies confirmed. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• Ukraine confirmed Thursday it had resumed attacks on Russian oil after a three-day hiatus. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• In the week since Trump's announcement of an energy ceasefire, Russia had attacked Ukraine's energy, oil and gas sectors 76 times, according to Zelenskyy. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• FP-1 drones also hit a VK data center in Novosergiyevka, Leningrad Oblast, causing serious damage, according to Fire Point. (Euromaidan Press, 2026-10-18)

What moved on the geopolitics beat in the seven days to 2026-10-19, and what is scheduled next.

• On 12 October 2026, the EU Council adopted the largest-ever package of listings targeting almost 1600 individuals and entities in Russia’s military-industrial complex. (INSIGHT EU MONITORING (citing EU Council), 2026-10-13)
• On 15 October 2026, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN stated that US and Israeli aggression against Iran triggered escalation and disrupted freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 2026-10-15)
• On 12 October 2026, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on Paraguay’s Minister of Information and Communication Technologies Gustavo Villate and Belize’s Foreign Minister Francis Fonseca over their countries’ ties with Taiwan. (Global Times (citing Chinese Foreign Ministry), 2026-10-12)
• The European Council on 16 October 2026 welcomed the 21st sanctions package against Russia and the extension of the EUMAM Ukraine mandate while regretting the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian diesel. (European External Action Service, 2026-10-19)
• The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which expires on 31 October 2026. (Security Council Report)
• Bulgaria will hold the first round of its presidential election on 25 October 2026, with a runoff on 1 November if no candidate wins an outright majority. (Control Risks, 2026-10-17)

Research for the week of 2026-10-19. Stewards with energy supply chains, marine insurance exposure, or operations in the Black Sea need to understand whether this represents a new scale of Ukrainian strike capability and what it signals about infrastructure vulnerability and potential Russian retaliation against shipping or energy facilities.

• Russia’s Ministry of Defense said Sunday that its forces had destroyed 1,015 Ukrainian drones over 15 Russian regions, as well as the annexed Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and the Black Sea. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• Ukrainian forces struck the Petersburg Oil Terminal with FP-1 drones, starting a fire; the company described the terminal as one of the region’s largest, handling 12.5 million tonnes of petroleum products a year, including for export. (Euromaidan Press, 2026-10-18)
• Fires broke out at the Petersburg Oil Terminal and the city’s Ruchi oil depot. (The Independent, 2026-10-19)
• On Dec. 11, 2025, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched its largest-scale, widest-reaching and most ambitious combined kamikaze drone operation... nearly 300 drones of various types, along with cruise missiles, struck targets across western and central Russia. (Kyiv Post, 2025-12-11)
• St. Petersburg products terminals capacity: 30,000,000 t/year. (FleetLeaks)
• Primorsk crude terminal capacity 67,000,000; Novorossiysk (Sheskharis) crude/products terminal 24,000,000 t/year. (FleetLeaks)
• According to ACLED data, Ukrainian forces have carried out, on average, three attacks a month against oil and fuel infrastructure in Moscow and the surrounding regions since May 2026. (ACLED, 2026-10-08)
• Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian state news agency Tass that Ukraine was resisting Moscow’s invasion but could not change the course of events. (Firstpost, 2026-10-18)

• On 15 September 2026 SIPRI published a news item announcing its data visualizations page that includes graphics on international arms transfers, military expenditure and world nuclear forces. (SIPRI, 2026-09-15)
• SIPRI published chapter 8 of the SIPRI Yearbook 2026 on world nuclear forces on 16 September 2026, reporting 12 187 nuclear weapons possessed by nine states at the start of 2026. (SIPRI, 2026-09-16)
• SIPRI published chapter 7 of the SIPRI Yearbook 2026 on international arms transfers on 16 September 2026, stating the volume of transfers in 2021–25 was the highest since the end of the cold war and had risen by 9.2 per cent compared with 2016–20. (SIPRI, 2026-09-16)

• UKMTO has received a time-late report of an incident 68NM northeast of Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia of a tanker struck by an unknown projectile on 16/10/2026. (UKMTO, 2026-10-16)
• On 05 Oct the vessel was hailed on VHF by the IRGC while transiting the SOH inbound at 0827 UTC and in position 2623N 05619E. (UKMTO / JMIC, 2026-10-08)
• On 04 Oct the vessel was struck by a suspected UAV while transiting the SOH inbound. (UKMTO / JMIC, 2026-10-08)
• On 05 Oct the vessel was struck by an unknown projectile while transiting the SOH outbound; fire ignited in the engine room and was subsequently extinguished. (UKMTO / JMIC, 2026-10-08)
• No projectile attacks to shipping reported to UKMTO in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden since 24/08/26. (UKMTO, 2026-10-16)
• UKMTO recorded 12 attacks on vessels over the past week in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, with one vessel lost. (gCaptain, 2026-10-16)

• On 11 September 2026, Italy submitted a request to the EU to activate the National Escape Clause for defence spending, seeking headroom to raise defence expenditure by up to 0.9 percentage points of GDP by the end of 2028. (Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 2026-10-16)
• In early October 2026, Italy's coalition scaled back its defence spending plans under the National Escape Clause, reducing the defence increment for 2028 from 0.6% of GDP to 0.3% and cutting the two-year defence envelope from around €21–22bn to about €14bn. (Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 2026-10-16)
• Germany's 2026 defence budget received significant upward revisions in a June 2026 update by the Federal Ministry of Finance, increasing it to EUR119.7bn. (International Institute for Strategic Studies)
• The German Federal Cabinet approved the 2027 draft budget and finance plan to 2030 in July 2026, adding EUR58.9bn to annual defence allocations over 2027–30 compared to the previous plan. (International Institute for Strategic Studies)
• NATO's Ankara Summit Declaration on 8 July 2026 announced more than $50 billion in new procurements by Allies. (NCIA NATO, 2026-07-08)
• The UK government confirmed an additional £15 billion for the Defence Investment Plan between 2026-27 and 2029-30, moving spending to 2.7% of GDP on core NATO defence from 2027-28 onwards. (UK Parliament)

• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2332 of 15 October 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine was published in the Official Journal L series on 15 October 2026. (EUR-Lex, 2026-10-15)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2283 of 12 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was published in the Official Journal L series on 12 October 2026. (EUR-Lex, 2026-10-12)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2258 of 8 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities was published in the Official Journal L series on 8 October 2026. (EUR-Lex, 2026-10-08)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2279 of 12 October 2026 adding 826 entities and 737 individuals to Annex I to Decision 2014/145/CFSP was published in the Official Journal on 12 October 2026. (EU Neighbours East, 2026-10-12)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1849 of 23 July 2026 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine was published in the Official Journal L series on 23 July 2026. (EUR-Lex, 2026-07-23)
• Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1939 of 7 August 2026 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine was published in the Official Journal L series on 7 August 2026. (EUR-Lex, 2026-08-07)

• ACLED now publishes daily data on Iran, along with Iranian and Houthi strikes across the Middle East, with every event reviewed and coded by researchers. (ACLED, 2026-10-16)
• Over August and September, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has increasingly targeted civilians in Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, and Macomia districts; in September, the group returned to threaten communities in Nangade. (ACLED, 2026-10-06)
• Russia strikes a key bridge in Kyiv, while Ukraine’s industrial capacity is being crushed under Russia’s bombardment (26 September – 2 October 2026). (ACLED, 2026-10-07)
• Ukraine’s strikes knock out refining capacity at a Moscow refinery, while Russia targets Ukrainian communications (19 – 25 September 2026). (ACLED, 2026-09-30)
• Ethiopia’s establishment of a new caretaker administration in Tigray marks a further breakdown of the Pretoria peace agreement, amid renewed fighting. (ACLED, 2026-10-16)
• JNIM has been increasing its attacks on mining operations along the Mali-Guinea border. (ACLED, 2026-10-08)

• On September 18, 2026, the State Department notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Ukraine for Air Defense Development Upgrade. (U.S. Department of State, 2026-02-26)
• On May 21, 2026, the State Department notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Ukraine for Hawk Missile System Sustainment. (U.S. Department of State, 2026-02-26)
• On May 5, 2026, the State Department notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Ukraine for Joint Direct Attack Munitions – Extended Range. (U.S. Department of State, 2026-02-26)
• In September 2026, Congress received no new Foreign Military Sales notifications for Taiwan. (Taiwan Security Monitor, George Mason University Schar School, 2026-10-07)

• On August 14, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule streamlining export controls for drone exports under the Export Administration Regulations by raising the endurance threshold for certain UAV national security controls from 30 minutes to 3 hours and making related changes, effective August 13, 2026. (Federal Register, 2026-08-14)
• On September 24, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a temporary final rule establishing criteria and processes to restrict stockpiling of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives under Proclamation 11052, effective through December 3, 2026. (Federal Register, 2026-09-24)
• On October 14, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security published a notice providing guidance to U.S. Customs and Border Protection on assessing U.S. content for tariffs under Proclamation 11032. (Federal Register, 2026-10-14)

• On October 15, 2026, OFAC designated individuals including Zhila Mohammadi, Milad Katebi, Amir Sabeti, Nazanin Borji, Fatemeh Vasighi Meraji, Azadeh Abdolalipur, and Farzad Allahyar linked to Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm Company under E.O. 13902. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026-10-15)
• On October 8, 2026, OFAC designated companies including Paritosh Shipping Inc., Ornella Shipping Inc., Hechuang International Group Limited, Kanha Shipping Inc., Shunhang Ship Management Limited, JLS Dragon Co Ltd, Brich Shipping Company Limited, Saint Abundant International Co Limited, and Science Ru Trading Co. Limited under E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s petroleum or petrochemical sectors. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026-10-08)
• On October 1, 2026, OFAC designated Iran Khodro Company, SAIPA Iranian Automobile Manufacturing Company, Iran Khodro Diesel Company, Pars Khodro Company, Zamyad Company, Niroo Motor Shiraz Industrial and Manufacturing Company, Niroo Motor Damavand Company, and Heavy Equipment Production Company under E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s automotive or manufacturing sectors. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026-10-01)
• On September 29, 2026, OFAC designated Seyyed Asghar Alizadeh Tabatabai, Kavoshcom Asia R and D Group, and Ali Fotowat Ahmady under E.O. 13382 for procuring weapons and components for Iran’s MODAFL. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026-09-29)
• On September 8, 2026, OFAC designated 27 Iranian airlines including Air Shiraz, Asa Jet Airline, Ata Airlines Company, Atlas Aviation Group, Ava Airlines, and Chabahar Airlines Company under E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s aviation sector. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026-09-08)
• On September 14, 2026, OFAC designated Russia’s VTB Bank under E.O. 13902 for maintaining correspondent banking relationships with Iranian banks and moving Iranian assets. (Institute for Financial Integrity, 2026-09-17)

• While oil and gas revenues have been supported by the global rise in crude prices amid the conflict in the Middle East, total fiscal revenues for January-August remain almost 17% below year-earlier levels, at RUB 5 trillion. (International Energy Agency, 2026-09-17)
• According to Russia’s Ministry of Finance, between April and August 2026, Russian oil companies received RUB 1.5 trillion (USD 18 billion) in subsidies, including through the damper mechanism, which compensates refiners when product export prices are higher than domestic fuel prices. (International Energy Agency, 2026-09-17)
• Russian oil exports declined by 420 kb/d in November, which combined with weaker prices, slashed revenues to $11 billion, $3.6 billion below a year ago. (International Energy Agency)
• Russia’s total oil exports fell by roughly 400 kb/d in November to 6.9 mb/d, as buyers assessed the implications and risks associated with more stringent sanctions. (International Energy Agency)
• Tax proceeds related to oil and natural gas production in the first nine months of the year declined to 5.47 trillion roubles ($64.43 billion) from 6.61 trillion a year earlier, finance ministry data showed on Monday. (Reuters, 2026-10-05)
• Russia's federal budget revenues from oil and gas dropped by 24% in 2025 to the lowest level since 2020, according to Finance Ministry data, as oil prices fell while the rouble appreciated. (Reuters, 2026-01-15)

• During the first two weeks of October, weekly container ship capacity transiting the Suez Canal averaged 753k TEU, according to Clarksons Research, compared with 1,457k TEU during the same period in 2023. (BIMCO, 2026-10-14)
• Suez container transits reached 314 in September, up 64.4% year on year and the highest monthly total since the Houthi attacks began in late 2023. (SeaNews, 2026-10-15)
• On 5 October, weekly scheduled capacity crossing Bab el-Mandeb at the gateway to the Red Sea in at least one direction stood at 448,273 TEU, which is 48% of the 930,679 TEU offered in August 2023 before ships began diverting around Cape of Good Hope. (Xeneta, 2026-10-17)
• During the first two weeks of October, 36% of total container ship capacity routed via either the canal or the Cape transited the canal, up from an average of 8% between 2024 and mid-2026. (BIMCO, 2026-10-14)
• Linerlytica estimates that more than 140 containerships, with a combined capacity of over 2 million teu, have returned to the Suez route since May. (Linerlytica, 2026-10-15)
• Saudi Arabia's inbound and outbound container throughput increased by 52.9% year-on-year to approximately 3.89 million TEUs in 2025. (Saudi Bureau of Statistics, 2026-09-18)

• The AI model “Model No. 13” forecasts enemy drone use near the line of contact based on historical data, weather conditions, and current battlefield situation, determining with high probability the intensity, locations, timeframes, and types of UAVs deployed; it has been validated on real-world datasets and is ready for integration into the Armed Forces of Ukraine's situational awareness systems. (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026-10-13)
• “Model No. 32” is a decision-support module that generates viable artillery operation plans by factoring in mission requirements, available weapon systems, ammunition, firing positions and constraints, applies logistics/ballistics/engagement zone parameters to rule out infeasible options, then evaluates and ranks viable alternatives; a prototype has been handed over to Ukrainian stakeholders for testing and verification. (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026-10-13)
• AI-enabled autonomous navigation raises the target engagement success rate of drones from around 10 to 20 percent to around 70 to 80 percent. (CSIS Wadhwani AI Center)
• AI replaces 99 percent of human labor in drone footage analysis and target recognition, target tracking, autonomous navigation including last-mile navigation, and sound and text analysis for intelligence extraction. (CSIS Wadhwani AI Center)
• In 2024, Ukrainian forces began purchasing 10,000 AI-enhanced drones. (CSIS Wadhwani AI Center)
• AI significantly enhances specific functions such as drone footage analysis and target recognition, target tracking, and autonomous navigation, including last-mile navigation. (CSIS Wadhwani AI Center)

• Polymarket prices the probability of a NATO-Russia military clash by December 31, 2026 at 25% as of October 13, 2026. (Global Political Spotlight, 2026-10-13)
• Polymarket prices the probability of a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 at 3.9% as of October 17, 2026. (Polymarkettrader.com, 2026-10-17)
• Polymarket prices the probability that China will invade Taiwan by the end of 2026 at 2.1% as of October 17, 2026. (Polymarkettrader.com, 2026-10-17)
• Polymarket prices the probability that the US will invade Iran before 2027 at 15.5% as of October 17, 2026. (Polymarkettrader.com, 2026-10-17)
• Polymarket prices the probability of Russia-Ukraine peace talks by December 31, 2026 at 34% as of October 17, 2026. (Polymarkettrader.com, 2026-10-17)
• Polymarket prices the probability of a Russia invasion of a NATO country by year-end 2026 at 6% as of October 6, 2026. (Polymarket AI on X, 2026-10-06)

• On 30 July 2025 Leonardo signed an agreement to acquire Iveco Defence for a total enterprise value of EUR 1.7 billion. (Leonardo, 2025-07-30)
• On 30 July 2025 Iveco Group announced the signing of a definitive agreement to sell its Defence Business (IDV and ASTRA brands) to Leonardo for an enterprise value of €1.7 billion. (Iveco Group, 2025-07-30)
• On 23 October 2025 Airbus, Leonardo and Thales signed a Memorandum of Understanding to combine their space activities into a new company with annual turnover of about €6.5 billion (end of 2024, pro-forma). (Airbus, 2025-10-23)
• On 2 March 2026 Rheinmetall announced the completion of the NVL acquisition with transition on 1 March 2026 after all antitrust approvals. (Rheinmetall, 2026-03-02)

• EU underground gas storage facilities were 72% full on October 1, 2026, around 11% below the level recorded at the same time last year and equivalent to approximately 74 bcm. (Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2026-10-09)
• With LNG from Qatar down by 20.8 Bcm year-on-year, and LNG from the rest of the world up by 13.5 Bcm, the net loss of 7.3 Bcm of supply represented a 5.4 per cent decline in global LNG imports. (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2026-10-12)
• Russian pipeline gas exports to Europe sank by 44 per cent in 2025 to 18 bcm, their lowest level since the mid-1970s following the closure of the Ukrainian transit route. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-09)
• Russian pipeline gas supplies declined by around 24% in winter 2025/26 compared with the previous winter, continuing the structural shift away from Russian pipeline supply following the end of transit through Ukraine. (ENTSOG, 2026-10-08)
• The front-month price at the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) reached $96.56 (86.03 euros) per megawatt-hour (MWh) in mid-October 2026, at its highest levels since December 2022. (OilPrice.com, 2026-10-15)
• Storage covered around 26% of EU gas consumption during winter 2025/26. (Gas Infrastructure Europe, 2026-10-09)

• Official production data shows that China’s integrated circuit output fell by 9.8 percent in 2022 following the imposition of export controls, which was the first decline in several years. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-03-24)
• In 2025, China produced 484.3 billion units of integrated circuits, up 10.9 percent year on year. (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology via Xinhua, 2026-01-30)
• In the years following the imposition of export controls, the domestic share of China’s AI chip market surged from 25 percent to 35 percent between 2024 and 2025. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-03-24)
• China’s National Bureau of Statistics reckons that its domestic IC production more than doubled between 2018 and 2023. (ThinkChina, 2026-09-17)
• SMIC and other Chinese firms bought $38 billion in equipment from the five top allied semiconductor manufacturing equipment suppliers in 2023, an increase of 66 percent from 2022. (Center for a New American Security)
• China’s integrated-circuit exports rose to $44.951 billion in September 2026, up 136 percent from a year earlier, according to data from China’s General Administration of Customs. (Bloomingbit / South China Morning Post, 2026-10-14)

• The Joint War Committee moved the Red Sea notification line further north after two Saudi-linked vessels were attacked following the Houthis’ July 20 announcement of a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-16)
• Indicative war risk premiums for Saudi ports north of Jizan, including Jeddah and Yanbu, have risen to about 1% of a ship’s value, up from 0.25% earlier this week. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-16)
• Premiums for voyages through the southern Red Sea have increased to between 1% and 2% of a ship’s value, compared with around 0.3% before the Houthis announced the embargo. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-16)
• Following the latest Israel-Hamas ceasefire in early October, the additional war risk premium for a ship sailing through the Red Sea has fallen to around 0.2% of hull value from 0.5% before the ceasefire. (S&P Global, 2025-12-04)
• Ships with a perceived American, British or Israeli nexus are now paying three times more for Middle East war risk cover than tonnage not associated with those countries. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-17)
• Several P&I clubs issued notices cancelling certain war-risk covers across a vast stretch of waters from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, effective from August 16, 2026, with cover available on separately agreed terms. (Splash247, 2026-08-13)

• The Black Sea Grain Initiative terminated on 17 July 2023. (United Nations)
• The Black Sea Grain Initiative enabled the export of over 32 million metric tons of grain and foodstuffs from Ukraine to 45 countries. (United Nations)
• Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated that Türkiye has prepared a plan for the safe passage of grain via the Black Sea and is in contact with both Russia and Ukraine regarding it. (World Ports Organization, 2026-10-06)

• Russian strikes have damaged 8.5 GW of generating capacity in Ukraine since October 2025, including thermal and hydroelectric power plants. (The New Voice of Ukraine, 2026-09-30)
• Ukraine had about 54.5 GW of generating capacity before the full-scale invasion, but that had been reduced to about 12 GW by the summer on the government's own figures. (bne IntelliNews, 2026-10-17)
• The plants in the table that have stopped generating since then — Kryvyi Rih, Kyiv’s CHPs and Kharkiv CHP-5 — have nameplate capacity of about 4.7 GW (2,820 MW + about 1,300 MW + 540 MW). (bne IntelliNews, 2026-10-17)
• Russian armed forces systematically and repeatedly targeted energy facilities across Ukraine throughout the 2025-2026 winter months, often using hundreds of weapons in coordinated attacks. (OHCHR, 2026-06-29)
• According to Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, the country's power sector saw over 3 100 disruptions due to Russian aggression between March and September 2025. (IEA, 2026-10-17)
• A massive overnight Russian strike on critical infrastructure in Kyiv, Kyiv region, and Kharkiv damaged 26 electric power elements and four oil and gas facilities, leaving at least 600,000 consumers without electricity supply. (Interfax-Ukraine, 2026-10-14)

• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of AH-1W Helicopter Spare and Repair Parts and related equipment for an estimated cost of $96 million, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)
• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of M107A7 Self-Propelled Howitzers and related equipment for an estimated cost of $4.03 billion, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)
• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $4.05 billion, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)
• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of Tube-launched, optically tracked, Wire-guided missile system and related equipment for an estimated cost of $353 million, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)
• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of Javelin Missile System and related equipment for an estimated cost of $375 million, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)
• On December 17, 2025, the State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) of ALTIUS-700M and ALTIUS-600 Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.1 billion, with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivering the required certification notifying Congress. (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2025-12-17)

• ACLED records 13 incidents of Palestinian attacks against Israeli settlers and security forces in the West Bank in September 2026, the highest monthly number since December 2025. (ACLED, 2026-10-09)
• Between January and September 2026, ACLED recorded 53 incidents of armed group activity against settlers in the West Bank, down from 408 in the same period of 2025. (ACLED, 2026-10-09)
• ACLED records more than 40 Israeli air- and drone strikes against Hamas and other militant targets in Gaza in June 2026, the highest monthly total since the ceasefire began in October 2025. (ACLED, 2026-10-09)
• UCDP recorded 3,190 events and 14,563 estimated deaths in Israel and Palestine in 2025. (ConflictStats (UCDP data))
• In the 12 months to 31 August 2026, UCDP recorded 1,265 events with a best estimate of 4,023 deaths in Israel and Palestine (preliminary). (ConflictStats (UCDP data))
• In the 12 months to 31 August 2026, UCDP recorded 1,136 events and 3,874 estimated deaths in the Gaza Strip and 94 events and 98 estimated deaths in the West Bank (preliminary). (ConflictStats (UCDP data))

• On December 2, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule adding new controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and 3 types of software tools for developing or producing semiconductors, new controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM), two new Foreign Direct Product rules, and related changes to impair production of advanced-node integrated circuits in China and Macau. (Bureau of Industry and Security, 2024-12-05)
• The December 2, 2024 interim final rule on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items has an effective date of December 2, 2024, with a compliance date of December 31, 2024 for changes to certain ECCNs including 3B001, 3B002, 3A090, and related items. (Bureau of Industry and Security, 2024-12-05)
• On August 29, 2025, the Bureau of Industry and Security closed a loophole by revoking Validated End-User authorizations that had allowed foreign-owned semiconductor manufacturers to export most U.S.-origin goods, software, and technology license-free to fabs in China. (Bureau of Industry and Security, 2025-08-29)
• On January 15, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security revised its license review policy for exports of certain advanced computing commodities with total processing performance less than 21,000 and total DRAM bandwidth less than 6,500 GB/s, such as the NVIDIA H200 or AMD MI325X, to China and Macau from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review provided specified conditions including U.S. supply sufficiency, third-party testing, and security procedures are met. (Bureau of Industry and Security, 2026-01-15)

• NATO's October 2025 compendium lists 2025e defence expenditure as a share of real GDP (2021 prices and exchange rates) at or above 2.00% for Albania (2.01), Belgium (2.00), Bulgaria (2.06), Canada (2.01), Croatia (2.03), Czechia (2.00), Denmark (3.22), Estonia (3.38), Finland (2.77), France (2.05), Greece (2.85), Hungary (2.06), Italy (2.01), Latvia (3.73), Lithuania (4.00), Luxembourg (2.00), Montenegro (2.03), Netherlands (2.49), North Macedonia (2.00), Norway (3.35), Poland (4.48), Portugal (2.00), Romania (2.28), Slovak Republic (2.04), Slovenia (2.02), Spain (2.00), Sweden (2.51), Türkiye (NATO, 2025-10-08)
• NATO's October 2025 compendium states that figures for 2025 are estimates and notes that certain Allies have national laws or political agreements calling for 2% of GDP or more to be spent on defence annually. (NATO, 2025-10-08)
• NATO Secretary General's 2025 Annual Report (March 2026) states that for the first time all 32 Allies reported defence expenditure that met or exceeded the 2% of GDP target. (NATO, 2026-03-30)
• NATO Secretary General's 2025 Annual Report (March 2026) states that European Allies and Canada invested a combined total of more than USD 571 billion (2021 prices) in defence in 2025, equal to 2.3% of their combined GDP. (NATO, 2026-03-30)
• NATO Secretary General's 2025 Annual Report (March 2026) states that three Allies already met the new 3.5% objective in 2025. (NATO, 2026-03-30)

• On January 15, 2025, OFAC designated OJSC Keremet Bank pursuant to E.O. 14024, as amended by E.O. 14114, for having conducted or facilitated significant transactions or services involving Russia’s military-industrial base. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025-01-15)
• On January 15, 2025, OFAC re-designated nearly 100 entities pursuant to E.O. 13662, including those previously designated under E.O. 14024 for operating in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy, exposing foreign persons facilitating significant transactions for them to mandatory secondary sanctions. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025-01-15)
• On October 22, 2025, OFAC designated Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company and Public Joint-Stock Company Oil Company Lukoil pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy, stating the action targets entities that fund the Kremlin’s war machine. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025-10-22)
• On October 22, 2025, OFAC designated multiple Russia-based subsidiaries of Rosneft and Lukoil pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating in the energy sector, with all entities 50 percent or more owned by them also blocked even if not specifically designated. (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025-10-22)

• ACLED records that since announcing a blockade of Saudi-linked shipping in July 2026, the Houthis have attacked 10 commercial vessels, the majority of which are tankers, with at least six successfully struck in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Gulf of Aden. (ACLED, 2026-10-01)
• From November 2023 to October 2025, there were more than 100 separate Houthi attacks on commercial vessels affecting more than 60 nations. (U.S. Maritime Administration, 2026-09-23)
• There have been 12 Houthi attacks or attempted attacks on commercial vessels in the southern Red Sea since July 2026, including ballistic missile attacks on Saudi oil tankers the Amzan and Ghazal. (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2026-09-22)
• The UN Security Council report lists specific 2026 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels including the Tihamah struck on 11 August 2026 in the southern Red Sea (four seafarers killed) and the Amzan on 24 August 2026 in the northern Red Sea. (United Nations, 2026-09-10)
• No corroborated Houthi maritime attacks on commercial vessels have occurred since 24 August 2026 according to ACLED. (ACLED, 2026-10-01)

• The Composite Index of National Capability consists of six dimensions: steel production, military spending, military personnel, energy consumption, total population and urban population. (Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2023-05-03)
• Scholars measure power in net rather than gross terms by creating a balance sheet subtracting liabilities from assets, and this net approach predicts war and dispute outcomes involving great powers over the past 200 years more accurately than gross indicators. (International Security, 2018-11-01)
• A measure of foreign policy realignment uses the absolute change in UNGA voting similarity score between a pair of states, ranging from -1 (least similar) to 1 (most similar). (Asian Review of Political Economy, 2024-02-13)
• An entropy method establishes a national power comprehensive assessment index system covering 144 countries and 38 indicators from 1990–2020, incorporating national resources and conversion mechanisms. (Journal of Chinese Political Science, 2023-05-03)

• In split-sample tests using the Butterworth international conflict data set, the neural network outperforms both discriminant analysis and ID3 in terms of accuracy; it is roughly comparable in accuracy to multinomial logit. (Social Science Computer Review, 1991-10-01)
• Because certain models have a demonstrated accuracy of over 80 percent in early identification of political crises, some have questioned whether such models should replace traditional qualitative analysis. (United States Institute of Peace, 2008-03-01)
• The best results for early warning are most likely obtained by the judicious combination of quantitative analysis based on forecasting models with qualitative analysis that rests on explicit causal relationships and precise forecasts of its own. (United States Institute of Peace, 2008-03-01)
• Research on clinical versus statistical prediction has demonstrated that algorithms make more accurate predictions than humans in many domains. (Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2023-08-29)
• In the IARPA forecasting competitions from 2011 to 2015, the Good Judgment Project won the tournament each year for 4 years using strategies that improved human forecasts. (Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2023-08-29)
• Models reliably identify persistent, high-violence hot spots but poorly predict new outbreaks or escalations of violence even with rich sub-national data from Colombia and Indonesia. (SSRN, 2019-06-01)

• The overall average time frame to deliver a capability increased this year to over 12 years. (U.S. GAO, 2026-07-02)
• Recent U.S. defense budgets have disproportionately invested in long-term developmental programs at the expense of producing sufficient capabilities available for the near term. (Center for a New American Security, 2025-10-21)
• Between 2018 and 2025, 18 out of 40 programs have entered the MTA pathway with immature technologies. (U.S. GAO, 2026-07-02)
• RAND researchers developed a framework that can measure S&T progress of foreign competing nations to help determine what should warrant the attention of DoD decisionmakers, with 17 measures across output, capacity, and leadership interest. (RAND Corporation, 2024-04-24)
• Defense organizations typically allocate a third or more of new defense funding to procurement. (Kearney, 2026-03-18)
• The Department of Defense tracks readiness through standardized metrics, including mission-capable rates and maintenance hours per flight or operating hour. (Military.com, 2026-01-23)

• The repression category in ACLED consists of all political violence events that include an interaction between state forces (actor type 1) and civilians or peaceful protesters (actor type 7 or 6), across any disorder type except Strategic Developments. (ACLED, 2025-07-30)
• UCDP defines an event as an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific location and a specific date. (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2026-05-20)
• UCDP GED contains events for three mutually exclusive types of organized violence: state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence against civilians. (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2024-05-21)
• UCDP codes events from news reports and alternative sources read individually by staff with case knowledge, with data vetted by project leaders, resulting in approximately 10,000-12,000 events coded annually. (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2024-05-21)

• Estimates of the effects of sanctions appear to be quite sensitive to model specification according to Bapat et al. (2013). (Annual Reviews, 2025-03-31)
• Hufbauer et al. (1990) found that sanctions partially achieved their intended results approximately one-third of the time. (Annual Review of Political Science, 2023-11-27)
• Success in economic sanctions is generally defined as the extent to which sanctions lead to full compliance by the target country, or at least a partial policy change that aligns with the stated objectives of the sanctioning country. (Econometrics, 2025-04-08)
• A meta-analysis published in 2025 that reviewed 37 studies reached the conclusion that there is no clear scholarly consensus on the extent to which some of the factors thought to determine whether sanctions succeed actually have an impact. (ICGS, 2026-10-05)

• The additional premium (the “additional war premium” or AP) is quoted as a percentage of the insured vessel value, applied to the value at risk for the duration the vessel is in the listed area. (straits.live, 2026-05-05)
• War insurance is calculated based on the “value of the ship,” which typically includes hull and machinery, permanent fixtures like anchors and communications systems and equipment such as lifeboats. (Insurance Business, 2025-08-29)
• These policies are subject to additional premiums — known as “APs” or “breach premiums” — every time a ship enters a designated war risk area, which are levied as a fraction of hull value and negotiated trip by trip. (Lloyd's List, 2026-03-05)
• They're having to be more dynamic with their pricing and they really have to look more granular exactly where vessels are, where they might be heading, and what the actual risks might be before setting their pricing. (WTW, 2026-10-16)
• Insurers have further refined their dynamic pricing models to quickly adapt to the ever-changing risk landscape. This has resulted in more frequent premium adjustments, sometimes on a weekly or even daily basis, depending on the severity of geopolitical events. (The Journal Magazine, 2025-07-29)
• The JWC has no regulatory authority. Its members do not coordinate pricing; they coordinate on which zones are considered higher-risk for the next pricing cycle. (straits.live, 2026-05-08)

• The traditional political science definition describes cohesion as a function of the degree of similarity between the objectives of the allies (Chernoff 1990). (International Politics, Springer Nature, 2024-11-30)
• To estimate the strength of alliance cohesion, we introduce four cohesion drivers—security threats, norms, institutions, and leadership—and assessment criteria. (International Politics, Springer Nature, 2024-11-30)
• Using United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting similarity as a proxy for political alignment (Voeten, 2009), we analyze the impact of trade, defense spending, regime type, and systemic polarity on cohesion between pairs of NATO member states. (NATO Science and Technology Organization)
• We offer a taxonomy that identifies six distinct empirical measures: alliance cohesion, ally cohesion, suballiance cohesion, ally deviation, ally adhesion, and alliance adhesion. (Global Governance, Brill, 2021-12-13)
• This study uses a quantitative analysis to test key structural, economic, and political drivers of NATO cohesion between 1949 and 2023... Through extensive data reaching 27.000 observations on economic interdependence, defense burden-sharing, geopolitical risks, regime similarity, threats, and NATO enlargement. (NATO Science and Technology Organization)
• NATO would have scored 4 during the Cold War, 2 between 1991 and 2014, and 3 since 2014 and the return of the Russian threat. (International Politics, Springer Nature, 2024-11-30)

• Comparing media-based event reports and those from military sources shows that the purported violence-increasing effect of cellphone coverage is partly due to higher reporting rates of violence in cellphone-covered areas, and a simple diagnostic procedure for this problem is implemented. (American Journal of Political Science, 2016-01-01)
• Media-based datasets are significantly more likely to under-report incidents of violence and civil unrest as conflict intensity or unrest increases, and significantly under-report non-lethal attacks by combatants. (Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, 2022-01-01)
• By linking media reports to firsthand accounts from a military database, events with a low number of observers tend to have higher reporting inaccuracies in location and severity. (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2015-01-01)
• Media sources severely underreport events in African countries, and coverage is also associated with country-level factors like international trade and subnational factors like access to communication technology. (International Interactions, 2020-11-01)
• Actor-specific reporting bias from Ukrainian, rebel, Russian and third party sources in Eastern Ukraine can yield estimates with vastly different implications for conflict resolution. (Unpublished manuscript, 2016-10-07)
• Two types of biases especially likely to lead to distortions in event datasets created from news sources are significance bias strongly influencing the reporting about certain types of victims and selection bias in event reporting by newspapers and news wires. (Cooperation and Conflict, 2013-01-01)

• The Entity List is found in Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 C.F.R. Part 744, Supp. No. 4). (Bureau of Industry and Security)
• The most recent version of the EAR can be found here and the Entity List can be accessed here. (Bureau of Industry and Security)
• The Consolidated Screening List (CSL) consolidates multiple lists maintained by the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury of individuals and organizations subject to specified, primarily trade-related restrictions, and includes the BIS Entity List. (Bureau of Industry and Security)
• Click here to download the Entity List as a .csv file. (Bureau of Industry and Security)
• BIS maintains three lists: the Denied Persons List (DPL); the Unverified List; and the Entity List. (Bureau of Industry and Security)
• A consolidated version of all of the U.S. Government proscribed parties lists is available here. (Bureau of Industry and Security)

• The consolidated list of individuals, groups and organisations subject to EU financial sanctions is available at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fsd/fsf#!/files, managed and updated by the European Commission DG FISMA. (European Commission, 2025-11-17)
• The EU sanctions map at https://sanctionsmap.eu/#/main provides comprehensive details of all EU sanctions regimes and their corresponding legal acts, including those adopted by the UN Security Council and transposed at EU level. (European Commission, 2025-11-17)
• Council decisions on restrictive measures and other EU legal acts on sanctions are available via EUR-Lex at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html, the official gateway to EU law with documents published in the Official Journal. (European Commission, 2025-11-17)
• The EU sanctions tracker tool at https://data.europa.eu/apps/eusanctionstracker/ monitors active listings of asset freezes, travel bans and other restrictive measures by regime, individual, entity and nationality, drawing from the consolidated lists managed by DG FISMA. (data.europa.eu)
• The EU sanctions tracker is built on the consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions and the consolidated list of persons subject to travel restrictions. (data.europa.eu)

• The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre publishes comprehensive quarterly and annual reports detailing incidents reported to the PRC, including breakdowns by type (boarded, hijacked, fired upon, attempted), locations, crew impacts, weapons, and vessel status. (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2026-01-14)
• The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre maintains a live piracy and armed robbery map showing all reported incidents for the current year, with details on incident number, date, sitrep, type (attempted attack, boarded, fired upon, hijacked, suspicious vessel), and estimated positions if exact coordinates are unavailable. (ICC – Commercial Crime Services)
• The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre follows the definition of piracy per Article 101 of the 1982 UNCLOS and armed robbery per IMO Resolution A.1025(26) adopted 2 December 2009. (ICC – Commercial Crime Services)
• The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre issues reports such as the January-September 2026 report recording 51 incidents (36 boarded, 8 hijacked, 4 fired upon, 3 attempted), with data on crew affected (105), weapons in 53% of cases, and vessel access status (86% at anchor or steaming). (ICC – Commercial Crime Services, 2026-10-15)
• The IMB Piracy Reporting Centre publishes reports including tables of actual and attempted incidents by location and year (e.g., Singapore Straits, Indonesia, Gulf of Guinea) and trends in crew violence, weapons, and regional activity. (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2026-01-14)

• The IISS publishes The Military Balance on its website in the publications section. (IISS)
• The Military Balance is The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual authoritative assessment of the military capabilities and defence economics worldwide and is published as a journal by Taylor & Francis. (Taylor & Francis)
• Our book publishers, Taylor and Francis, have a full back-catalogue of publications available for purchase. (IISS)
• The Military Balance 2025 - 1st Edition is published by Routledge. (Routledge)
• The Military Balance has been published since 1959 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (Routledge)

• OFAC's Sanctions List Search tool at https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-search-tool employs fuzzy logic to search the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List and Non-SDN Consolidated Sanctions List. (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
• OFAC's Sanctions List Service at https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-service provides easy access to the most up-to-date Sanctions Lists and data ready for immediate download, including the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List or the Consolidated (non-SDNs) List. (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
• OFAC publishes the SDN list in XML, fixed-field, delimited, and comma separated values (CSV) formats that can be imported into databases or spreadsheets. (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
• Users can access the SDN List and other sanctions lists via the Sanctions List Service application at https://sanctionslist.ofac.treas.gov/ for downloads or custom datasets. (Office of Foreign Assets Control)
• The best way to get the SDN list is from OFAC's website, where it is disseminated in XML, fixed field/delimited files, and other formats. (Office of Foreign Assets Control)

• SIPRI publishes the Military Expenditure Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex . (SIPRI, 2026-10-16)
• SIPRI publishes the interactive Military Expenditure Database at https://milex.sipri.org/sipri . (SIPRI)
• SIPRI publishes the Arms Transfers Database at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers . (SIPRI, 2026-10-16)
• SIPRI provides direct access to the Arms Transfers Database at https://armstransfers.sipri.org . (SIPRI, 2026-10-16)

• ACLED collects reported information on the type, agents, location, date, and other characteristics of political violence events, demonstration events, and other select non-violent, politically-relevant developments in every country and territory in the world. (ACLED, 2026-07-13)
• ACLED data are coded in real time and published on a weekly basis following a multi-stage internal review process. (ACLED, 2026-07-13)
• Data can be downloaded through the export tool, curated data files (which include regional data files and files for specific subsets like violence targeting civilians), or API with a free account. (ACLED, 2026-07-13)
• ACLED is the highest-quality and most widely used near-real-time source on political violence and protest data worldwide. (ACLED, 2026-10-14)

• The UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 26.1 is available for free download at the UCDP Dataset Download Center. (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
• UCDP GED covers individual events of organized violence that are geo-coded down to the level of individual villages, with temporal durations disaggregated to single days. (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research)
• For programmatic or bulk access to UCDP data including GED, the UCDP API provides structured JSON access. (Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research)